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The Use of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(4) in Child Abuse Cases
by Sharon P. O'Neill

I. Introduction
Recent public awareness of child
abuse l has brought to the forefront
the problems which face the victim, 2the prosecution, and the defendant at trial. Existing tensions between the Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation, state interests, and
the rule against hearsay with its
assorted exceptions intensify when
the child abuse victim discloses the
perpetrator's identity during medical diagnosis and treatment. In many
instances, these statements create
the sole means of identifying the
defendant as the guilty party. The
prosecution, therefore, will often attempt to admitthis evidence through
the testimony of a non-declarant
under Federal Rule of Evidence
(hereinafter FRE) 803(4), as statements for the purposes of medical
diagnosis and treatment, or an analogous state exception. 3
Child abuse most often occurs in
secrecy, 4 with the child and the
abuser being the only witnesses.
Problems arise when the abused
child fails to meet competency requirements, Sis unavailable fortestimony, or recants testimony while
on the stand. 6 Under these circumstances, the prosecution must attempt to elicit the victim's prior
statements through other witnesses
under an exception to the hearsay
rule. '
This article will focus on how
statements made by the victim to

physicians, psychiatrists, or psychologists8 create multiple hearsay
problems when they describe events
or identify the perpetrator. It first
will discuss background law on hearsay and Rule 803(4). Second, it will
discuss the need for a hearsay exception in child abuse prosecutions.
Third, it will examine the physician's
and psychologist's roles in the diagnosis and treatment of the abused
child. Finally, this article will examine the case law relevant to the
admission ofout-of-court statements
made in the course of medical diagnosis and treatment which divulge
the cause ofthe abuse or the identity
of the abuser.
II. Background Law
A. Rule Against Hearsay

Hearsay is a statement made by
an out-of-court declarant which is
offered into evidence for its truth as
to the matter asserted. 9 Federal Ru Ie
of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay
as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."lo Assertions may be
either verbal or non-verbal. II In the
abuse context, a child makes a verbal assertion when she speaks,
writes, or responds to questions by
the physician or psychologist. A
non-verbal assertion occurs, for example, when in response to a question a child nods her head 12 or points

to part of her body or to that of an
anatomically-correct doll.
Under this definition, non-hearsay statements would be those which
are not offered for the truth of content or those made by a declarant
while testifying under oath, subject
to cross-examination, before the trier
offact. 13 Forinstance, observations
by a witness that a child has used
inappropriate vocabulary or has precocious sexual knowledge could be
admitted as circumstantial evidence
of the child's exposure to sexual
activity. These same observations,
however, would be hearsay if admitted to prove their truth that the
defendant abused this child. 14
The rule against hearsay (hereinafter the "hearsay rule") assumes
that many possible inaccurate and
untrustworthy sources underlie the
bare untested assertion of an out-ofcourt declarant. "The opponent is
unable to confront and cross examine the real witness (the declarant)
and to expose weaknesses in his
statement."IS
B. Exceptions to the Rule Against
Hearsay

While cross-examination may be
the best means for establishing the
truth of statements made by a
declarant,16 exceptions to the hearsay rule have developed at common
law.11 More recently, some ofthese
exceptions have been codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE
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803 and 804),18 as well as in various tion and then be subject to crossstate codes. 19 These exceptions pro- examination. When the declarant is
vide an avenue for admitting hear- unavailable, a greater danger of
say based on the assumption that faulty fact finding arises as she can''the declarant's truthfulness is ... not be scrutinized under cross-exclear from the surrounding circum- amination.
stances. "20 As statements admitted
In order to admit hearsay, the
under these exceptions are inher- prosecution may need to first demently reliable and trustworthy, the onstrate the unavailability of the
test of cross-examination has "mar- declarant and the necessity of the
ginal utility."21
statement,27 and second demonstrate
that the statement bears adequate
C. Balancing Sixth Amendment "indicia of reliability."28 For the
most part, however, out-of-court
Rights with the Needfor Hearsay
The Confrontation Clause of the statements are admissible when they
Sixth Amendment to the United fall within a "finnly rooted hearsay
States Constitution, made applicable exception" or have been shown from
to the states by way of the Four- the totality of the circumstances to
teenth Amendment, provides "[t]hat demonstrate a "particularized
in all criminal prosecutions, the ac- guarantee of trustworthiness."29
cused shall have the right ... to be Firmly-rooted exceptions would be
confronted with witnesses against those recognized at common law
him ... .'>22 This right encompasses and those by rule. Those created by
three elements: (1) the rightto cross- statute do not fall within this group,
examine the witness, (2) the right to because they require the proponent
have the jury view the witness' de- to demonstrate reliability and trustmeanor, and (3) the right to face-to- worthiness. 3o
face confrontation with the witness. 23
"The Confrontation Clause acts D. Statements Made for the Purin tandem with the hearsay rule to poses of Medical Diagnosis and
afford criminal defendants the right Treatment.
One finnly-rooted hearsay exto confront available accusatory
witnesses in court, where theirtesti- ception makes statements made for
mony is given under oath before the the purposes of medical diagnosis
fact finder, and where the defendant and treatment admissible. Under
may subj ectthe testimony to search- the common law,31 this exception
ingcross-examination."24 Taken lit- excluded statements made to the
erally, the Sixth Amendment pre- non-treating physician for the sole
vents evidence which falls within a purpose of providing testimony.
hearsay exception from being ad- This exclusion was based on the
mitted against the accused. 25 The belief that such statements had no
Supreme Court, however, has never guarantee of truthfulness. Rule
interpreted the Confrontation Clause 803(4), however, does not differento exclude the admission ofall hear- tiate between treating and non-treatsay.26
ing physicians. 32 Rule 803(4)33 proConflicts between the Sixth vides that:
Amendment and hearsay can arise
The following are not excluded from the hearsay rule
regardless of the availability ofthe
declarant. When the declarant is
even though the declarant
available, she can confinn or refute
is available as a witness:
hearsay admitted under an excep-
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(4) Statements for purposes
of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing
medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain or
sensation, or the inception
or general character of the
cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
and treatment.
Statements admitted under this
exception relate to medical history,
to bodily feelings (past or present),
or to inception or general cause of
the injury or the disease. 34 "[Rule
803(4)] does not embrace statements
or parts of statements which are not
reasonably pertinent" to either diagnosis or treatment. 35
The trustworthiness of such statements is based on two independent
rationale. First, the person seeking
medical attention serves her own
self-interest by giving truthful infonnation in order to receive accurate diagnosis and treatment. 36 Second, if a medical expert would rely
on such a statement as a basis for
diagnosis or treatment, the statement is reliable. 37 The motivation
to receive proper medical attention
reduces the dangers of untruthfulness. Such a declarant is less likely
to (1) give an inaccurate description
of intimate events, (2) have a poor
recollection of bodily feelings and
condition, (3) lack knowledge regarding her experience with symptoms, and (4) articulate ambiguously.38
Because a motivation to promote
an accurate diagnosis and treatment
is crucial to the statement's reliability, no requirement exists that the
statement be made to a physician.39
Statements made by third parties40
could qualify under this exception if
this person has an interest in the
well-being of the patient, such as a
parenf4 1 or relative. 42 In most scenarios, a non-abusive parent would

have no motive to mislead the physician and would be able to describe
the child's symptoms based on her
intimacy with the child. The relationship between the declarant and
the child, therefore, detennines the
admissibility of the hearsay.43
Statements attributing fault ordinarily do not qualify under the
language of Rule 803(4) unless the
statement reasonably pertains to diagnosis or treatment. 44 These statements are considered less reliable
because the declarant may be motivated by a desire other than to assist
in diagnosis or treatment. 4S
Special problems arise when
statements are made to psychologists by their patients. 46 Rule 803 (4)
does not expressly cover statements
made pertaining to the declarant's
mental health. Statements made to
the psychologist which are then relayed to the physician fall within the
language of Rule 803(4) as "statements made for the purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment."47
These statements, irrespective of
their context, are pertinent because
experts in psychology view all mental processes as being relevant to
diagnosis and treatment. 48 Such
statements, nevertheless, may lack
reliability because the patient's mental impainnent my have decreased
her ability to accurately describe,
recall, perceive, or clearly articulate
the events.

III. The Need For Hearsay And
The Use of FRE 803(4) In Child
Abuse Cases
Out-of-court statements made by
abused children are often essential
to the state's case. These statements
are admissible when the court has
detennined that the child is incompetent orunavailable fortestimony. 49
While the state may have sufficient
proofthatchildabusehas occurred, so
this abuse, especially that of asexual

nature,sl most often occurs in secret
with the child being the sole person
who can identify the assailant. S2
Circumstantial evidence, therefore,
becomes crucial to the state's case.
This would include expert testimony, character evidence, and hearsay elicited through testimony of a
physician and/or psychologist.
The use of out-of-court statements made to physicians and psychologists conflicts with the
defendant's right to confrontation.
In deciding whether to admit such
statements, the court must strike a
balance between the societal interests of protecting the child and punishing the abuser with its own role
in promoting accurate fact finding.
In dealing with these out-of-court
statements, the court has three options. It may refuse to admit the
statement, pennit the statement to
come in under an established exception, or admit the statement through
statutorily-created child abuse exceptions. This last option pertains to
an attempt by state legislatures to
deal with testimonial problems in
child abuse cases. Maryland has
two such exceptions: the Closed
Circuit Television Exception and
the Child Abuse Hearsay Exception.
The Closed Circuit Television
ExceptionS3 protects an allegedly
abused child from experiencing
emotional trauma which would inhibit her ability to reasonably communicate before the court. Afterthe
judge detennines that a child is unable to communicate in front of the
defendant, the child testifies outside
of the court in a room with counsel
for both sides present. This room
contains equipment operators, and
unless the defendant objects, any
person the court believes contributes to the child's well-being. 54
While this exception provides an
avenue for obtaining in-coUrt testi-

mony from the child, it also provides a means for the defendant to
see the child and to question the
child about statements made to the
physician. ss
The Child Abuse Hearsay Exception 56 establishes limited conditions under which out-of-court statements made by abused children can
be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. To invoke this rule, the
child must be either available to
testify in court or by closed circuit
television, or shown to be unavailable. 57
If the child is not available, the
hearsay offered through this exception must not be admissible under
any other exception and must be
corroborated by the evidence. 58 This
means the state must prove that the
statement it proffers possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."s9
In a sexual abuse case where the
prosecution has no corroborative
evidence, the latter requirement may
be most difficult to prove. When
corroborative evidence does exist,
the statement may be inadmissible
because it had not been specifically
made to a physician, teacher, social
worker, orpsychologist in the course
of her profession. 60 The state will,
therefore, use this latter exception
only when it cannot get the child's
statement in the record under one of
the "firmly rooted" exceptions such
as Rule 803(4).
Rule 803(4) is better suited for
this purpose because statements admitted under this exception are assumed to be trustworthy. Conflicts
between the use of Rule 803(4) and
the Confrontation Clause are lessened when the child is available to
testify and can refute or verify the
hearsay. When the child cannot
testify, this rule does not require a
showing of the declarant's unavailability or proof of notice to the de-
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fendant which are required under from an outside referral source such
the child abuse hearsay exception. as a pediatrician's office.
Once the team accepts a referral,
IV. The Role of The Physician or the social worker takes an initial
Psychologist in Child Abuse Cases history and social assessment. The
"At a time of shortened social pediatrician or nurse practitioner69
services and of increasing visibility performs a physical examination and
of family violence, it is often the orders any necessary diagnostic tests.
medical office or pediatric emer- The psychologist or social worker70
gency department that serves as the conducts an investigative interview
portal of entry into the service sys- which may include the use of anatem.'>61 The physician, bound by the tomically-correct dolls to enable an
Hippocratic oath,62 has a duty to inarticulate victim to demonstrate
diagnose and treat patients accu- the event. The physician leading the
rately. When child abuse is sus- team uses the information obtained
pected, the physician has two obli- by its members to diagnose the type
gations: (1) a duty to treat the ofabuse and to establish a therapeuphysical and emotional conse- tic plan ofcare. 71
quences ofabuse, and (2) a statutory
duty63 to report suspected abuse to B. The Evaluation of the Child
authorities. Any medical history,
The evaluation ofthe child contherefore, which establishes the im- sists ofa medical history, a physical
mediate treatment needs and raises examination, a developmental exa level of suspicion regarding the amination, and a diagnostic evaluapossibility of abuse should be care- tion.
a. Medical History
fully recorded.
The medical history provides a
A proper evaluation of an allegedly abused child usually includes means for the physician to construct
an initial history and social assess- a time line of salient events associment, a physical examination, diag- ated with suspected abuse. This
nostic tests, and an investigative information is obtained in separate
interview. 64 Reports of suspected interviews from each available parabuse are made when sexual abuse ent while the child is not present.
has been alleged or the injury is The rationale behind this tactic lies
inconsistent with the history ob- in the beliefthat parents72 and chiltained for the child's developmental dren will be less fearful of disclosing abuse when other parties are not
age. 6S
present. 73 As child abuse and neA. The Use ofChildAdvocacy Teams glect are symptomatic of a dysfuncMany hospitals have created tional family,14 the physician must
Child Advocacy Teams66 which take remain attentive to discrepancies
a non-partisan role in determining between the comments of each parwhether there is evidence of neglect ent and the child. Suspect comwhich should be referred to the au- ments include persistently negative
thorities. 67 This team typically in- characterizations of the child, discludes a pediatrician, a nurse,68 a parities between each parent's view
social worker, and a psychologist or of the child, and their individual
psychiatrist. Referrals most often descriptions of parenting practices.
come from within the hospital
A pediatric history usually starts
through a clinical unit or the emer- with neutral questions regarding the
gency room. They may also come child's size at birth and attainment
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ofcertain developmental milestones,
such as putting words together at an
early age. The parent is questioned
about the child's behavior, with attention to recent changes in behavior. Finally, the parent is questioned about specific injuries to determinethe level ofrisk to the child 75
b. Physical Examination
The type of physical examination the child must undergo depends
upon the original complaint that
precipitated the visit to the physician. "Physicians must approach an
injury as a symptom requiring a
diagnosis of cause," as accidental
injuries may be difficult to distinguish from non-accidental ones. 76
Though signs and symptoms of
abuse may be blatant, the majority
are subtle in nature. 77 The physician, therefore, must have an understanding ofthe common manifestations of child abuse. 78
During a routine physical examination, the physician inspects
the child's body for bruising, deformities, and trauma. 79 She listens to
the chest and abdomen for irregularities. She visualizes the retina of
the eye to observe retinal bleeding
or lesions and the oral cavity to
detect mucosal lesions or dental
trauma. She examines the inner ear
to identify eardrum perforations and
other deformities. Digital and visual examinations 80 of inner vaginal
and rectal areas are performed only
if there are complaints, symptoms,
or suspect surface areas.
c. Developmental Examination
The physician must evaluate the
child's motor skills to determine if
the reported cause of an accident is
consistent with the child's developmental age. Accidental injuries require the child to have certain motor
capabilities. For example, a fall
from a bed is not possible ifthe child
is unable to roll over. If a sibling is
blamed by the caretaker for an in-

jury, the physician must question
whether it is physically and developmentally possible for the sibling
to have caused the injury.81
d. Diagnostic Evaluation
Diagnostic evaluation ofthe child
depends largely on the results of the
medical history and physical obtained by the physician. The nature
of the suspected injury, the possibility of abuse, and the child's age
also factor into the physician's decision to order diagnostic tests. These
tests may include:
1. Radiologic imaging: 82
In children under five years of
age, bone surveys83 using roentgenograms (x-rays), or more sophisticated radionuclide skeletal
scintigraphy (bone scans), detect
fractures and other skeletal injuries
not identified with conventional xray techniques.
The CTICAT scan tests can identify acute and chronic head injuries
and facilitate the diagnosis of abdominal injuries.
2. Laboratory studies:
Samples of any fluids are sent to
the laboratory for identification.
These fluids might include semen
found during an external or internal
vaginal or rectal examination.
Cultures are taken if sexual abuse
has been reported or to interpret the
clinical findings of sexually transmitted diseases (hereinafter SID'S)84
when no sexual abuse information
has been elicited from the child or
parent. 8S
Based on the findings of the
medical history, physical, developmental evaluation, and diagnostic
tests, the diagnosis of suspected
abuse is made. The physician then
is obligated to report this suspicion
to the appropriate authorities.

abused child. Because a parent will
not usually bring the child to a psychologist for evaluation, the psychologist ordinarily becomes involvedupon referral from thephysician or the child advocacy team.
After the treatment of associated
medical problems,86 the psychologist then evaluates the child to ascertain and treat the psychological
consequences ofabuse. A variety of
treatment modalities, such as therapeutic play and art, may be used to
facilitate communication with the
child. 87 Diagnosis and treatment
may also involve an evaluation of
other family members.
V. Statements as to Cause and
Identity in Abuse Cases

The infonnation obtained during medical and psychological diagnosis and treatment often provides evidence for prosecuting the
abuser. The state's ability to protect
the child frequently rests on the
physician's or psychologist's response to the child and her ability to
observe and record. Though the
victim may be aware of possible
criminal charges being brought
against the abuser, courts have per- .
mitted hearsay testimony from physicians and psychologists regarding
the cause ofthe abuse. 88 These same
assertions, however, are inadmissible when the physician or psychiatrist performs the evaluation in
preparation for impending civillitigation. 89 This is because statements
made to the practitioner may have
motivations other than the need for
diagnosis and treatment and are,
therefore, less reliable.
Rule 803(4) has been used in
child abuse cases to admit into evidence those assertions made to physicians and psychologists which
C. The Role of the Psychologist
describe symptoms and the general
A psychologist also may playa cause of the abuse. 90 Dispute over
similar role in the evaluation of an the admissibiIity ofthese statements

centers around whether they meet
the requirement that such statements
be "pertinent to diagnosis and treatment."
A physician ordinarily may not
testify under Rule 803(4) that a child
told her the identity ofthe abuser.91
The rationale behind this rule stems
from the belief that the doctor has a
responsibility to diagnose and treat,
rather than to investigate illegal conduct, 92 Additionally, if the victim
believes she is being asked the identity ofthe perpetrator, the reliability
ofthe statement may be destroyed. 93
Trustworthiness does remain intact,
however, when the same statement
has been motivated by the desire to
aid medical diagnosis and treatment.
In order for a court to admit these
out-of-court statements under Rule
803(4), the child must have been
able to formulate the medical problem and communicate this problem
to some other person for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment. 94
Children are often too young to appreciate the necessity of truthfulness in obtaining treatment, or to
understand "the relationship between their statements and receiving effective medical treatment.'>9S
For example, statements made during play therapy can create problems for the court. In determining
admissibility, the court must first
decide whether the play sessions are
congruent with treatment or diagnosis. If so, the court must find that the
child made the statement with an
intent to assist the psychologist in
diagnosis and treatment. 96
The competency ofthe child also
plays a role in some courts' admission or exclusion of hearsay . Courts
which exclude statements made by
incompetent children do so based
on the beliefthat a child who cannot
appreciate the significance oftruthful testimony cannot be capable of
providing the physician with accu-
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rate infonnation. 97 Other courts differentiate between the trustworthiness of statements made to physicians and those made in court while
testifying. 98 "The cornerstone [in
these courts] is whether the statement is reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.'>99

ting statements made to psychologists argue that intra-family dynamics in child abuse cases create a need
for a special interpretation of Rule
803(4) and its application. llo This
belief stems from the fact that there
is a proportional increase in the reoccurrence of abuse when the identified abuser is a family member.
VI. Case Law
Several federal cases have influIn Idaho v. Wright, a 1990 deci- enced the states' expansion of Rule
sion, the Supreme Court identified 803(4). In UnitedStatesv. Iron Shell,
several factors which it believed the United States Court of Appeals
properly relate to the reliability of for the Eighth Circuit held that it
out-of-court assertions made by chil- was not error to allow into evidence
dren.lOo These factors include the statements made by a nine year-old
mental state of the declarant, the use child pertaining to her sexual asoftenninologyunexpected in achild sault. III The court reasoned that the
of similar age,IOI the spontaneity victim's statements to the examinand repetition of the statement, 102 ing physician related to the child's
and a lack of motivation to fabricate physical condition and were thus
the statement. 103 Other consider- consistent with a motivation for
ations include, but are not limited treatment.ll2
The Iron Shell court established
to, the child's age, the presence of
corroborating evidence, and the a two-part test for detennining the
child's relationship to the accused admissibility of hearsay under this
and to the person to whom the state- exception. "First, is the declarant's
ment was made. 104
motive consistent with the purpose
In sexual abuse cases, questions of the rule; and second, whether it is
concerning the reliability of out-of- reasonable for the physician to rely
court statem.ents made by children on the infonnation in diagnosis or
center around whetherthe statements treatment."113 While the testimony
are intrinsically reliable. Courts elicited from the physician did not
which accept the intrinsic reliability name the defendant as the assailant,
of this type of hearsay justify their the court noted that identity would
actions with two rationales: (1) chil- rarely be sufficiently related to didren do not persistently lie to par- agnosis and treatment. 114
ents or other authority figures about
While Iron Shell remained within
sexual abuse, and (2) children have the bounds ofRule 803(4), this same
an insufficient knowledge base to court stretched these boundaries in
lie about sexual matters. lOS Those United States v. Renville. lIS In
courts adopting a contrary view fo- Renville, the victim of child abuse,
cus on the ability of the child to tell during in- court testimony, recanted
stories and fantasize. 106
earlier statements identifying her
In recent times, state courts have father as the abuser. The treating
split as to the admissibility of state- physician, over an objection, rements made to physicians pertain- peated the child's statement which
ing to cause l07 or fault l08 in child identified her father as the abuser.
abuse cases. Similar statements The court of appeals affinned, findmade to psychologists are on even ing as follows:
weaker footing. 109 Courts admit-
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[A] statement by a child
abuse victim that the abuser
is a member ofthe victim's
household presents a sufficiently different case from
that envisaged by the drafters of [R]ule 803(4) that it
should not fall under the
general rule. Statements by
a child abuse victim to a
physician during an examination that the abuser is a
member of the victim's
immediate household are
reasonably pertinent to
treatment. I16
This logic has been criticized because its application is problematic.
For example, in State v. Nelson, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a
lower court ruling admitting a statement made by a three year-old child
to her psychologist. The statement
identified the child's father, Nelson,
as the perpetrator ofsexual abuse. 117
Criticism of Nelson centers
around evidence elicited on crossexamination that the child had on
several occasions identified the defendant, her mother's live-in boyfriend, as the abuser.118 Without
this statement identifying Nelson,
the defendant might have been more
successful in creating a real doubt in
the minds of the jury that someone
other than himself committed the
abuse. I 19
Other state courts have taken a
position contrary to Renville by not
admitting any statements of identificationunderRule803(4).InSulka
v. State, 120 a three year-old girl sustained injuries when she was struck
in the face with a shoe. This child
identified Sulkaas the assailant during a physical examination by a
physician. The Alaska Supreme
Court held that the identification of
Sulka was not pertinent to diagnosis
and treatment of the child's injuries
and that the trial court denied the

defendant his right to confrontation
by admitting the statements ofidentification.
In Maryland, the court of special
appeals has published two diametrically opposed rulings on the admissibility of statements of identity in
child abuse cases. In the 1988 decision of Cassidy v. State, argued before Judges Moylan, Wilner and
Weant, the court held that statements to a physician by a two yearold that "Daddy did this" were inadmissible. 121 The basis for this decision was the court's belief that the
two year-old "lacked the motive or
purpose which is the heart of the
trustworthiness guarantee."122 The
court further noted that, even if the
declarant in this case had the requisite understanding of the nature of
the medical interview, the assertion
would still not have been medically
related to treatment. The aim of
treatment, according to the court, is
to determine the need for physical
measures such as surgical intervention, antibiotics, or x-rays.123 The
court did note, however, that identity might playa role in the treatment of a victim who contracted a
communicab Ie disease as a result of
abuse. 124
In determining the inadmissibility of the identification, the court
postulated that the Renville line of
cases strained to procure the identity of the abuser into evidence.
While laudable, the Renville court
effectively ignored the state of mind
of the declarant and instead turned
to that of the physician. The focus
became the mission of the physiciano The Renville court moved
from statements pertinent to treatment of the physical injury, to the
emotional injury, to final social disposition (state reporting statutes) as
being included under Rule 803(4) in
child abuse cases.
In In re Rachel T., a case in

opposition to Cassidy, Judges
Wilner, Rosalyn Bell, and Pollitt
upheld a circuit court ruling which
permitted testimony by a physician
and a psychologist as to the child's
identification of the perpetrator. 12S
A five year-old girl had been referred to a pediatric rape center l26
after her pediatrician discovered
vaginal bleeding. Thepediatrician's
examinationidentifiedcertainphysical findings consistent with sexual
abuse. 121 The child was later seen
on four occasions by a psychologist. 128 She told both the psychologist and the social worker that her
father was the perpetrator. These
statements were excluded by the
trial court pursuant to Cassidy.
The court of special appeals determined that the trial court erred in
not admitting these statements. The
court differentiated the facts of this
case with Cassidy by stating that
"[t]here is a vast difference between
cognitive development ofatwoyearold and a child of five. From the
content, one can tell that the five
year-old child understood that the
alleged secret she shared with her
father was an important one."129
The court first suggested that
Rachel knew her statements would
be used to obtain treatment and prevent future exposure to abuse. Second; it stated that the child might
have been exposed to venereal disease (using the avenue left open in
the Cassidy opinion). Third, the
court postulated that ifthe mother's
story that Rachel injured herself on
a broom handle had been true, she
would have needed a tetanus shot.
Based on these facts, the court determined that the information obtained from the social worker and
psychologist were reasonably pertinentto diagnosis and treatment, and,
thus, admissible. 130
Reconciling these two cases is
not an easy task. In re Rachel T.,

however, does fit neatly into
Cassidy's dicta that a child's contact with a communicable disease
might require the admission of such
statements. The children in these
cases were five and two years-old
respectively, with different injuries.
At this point, it is difficult to predict
whether facts ofa future case will be
found more similar to Cassidy or
Rachel T. and thus whether the statements by physicians and/or psychologists will be found admissible.
VII. Conclusion
Child abuse most often occurs in
secrecy, with the abused child and
the assailant being the only witnesses. In such cases, the need to
admit hearsay becomes even more
pressing, particularly when the child
cannot testify or recant a previous
statement while testifying at trial.
This makes the need to admit the
child's out-of-court statements crucial to the fact-finding process.
Rule 803(4), regarding statements
for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, provides the best
avenue for admitting such evidence,
because it is a "firmly-rooted exception" whose "particularized guarantees oftrustworthiness" have already
been established. The biggest problem with the use of this exception
occurs when it is used to identify the
alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
Endnotes
·See generally Johnson, Inflicted Injury Versus Accidental Injury, 37 PediatricClinicN.Am. 791, 791-96(1990)
(discussing problems of defining child
abuse and neglect).
2Buckley, Introduction: Background
and Overview of Child Abuse, 40 U.
Miami L. Rev. 5,6 (1985).
3Thirty-three states have adopted rules
similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence. These states include: Alaska
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Fed. R. Evid. 803. Five additional
exceptions can be used only when the
declarant is unavailable. See Fed. R.
Evid.804.
19Examples of legislatively enacted
exceptions include the residual or
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257 (1989) [hereinafierMosteller, Child
Sexual Abuse].
37Capra, supra note 36, at 7 col. 2.
3SWhitecomb, supra note 5, at 33.
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App. 1988) (statements to social worker
identifying perpetrator aided in medical evaluation and diagnosis of child's
physical and behavioral problems; this
court recognized that child had been
taken to social worker at recommendation ofphysician and prosecuting attorney). But see Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d
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that child can be competent when mak- 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding ading statements to physician and later be missible a child's statements that injufound to be incompetent to testify in ries were caused by a beating with a
court), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1253 hammer); State v. Herbert, 480 A.2d
742 (Me. 1984) (holding that injuries
(1984).
99State v. Miller, 539 N.E.2d 693, 698 sustained by the victim warranted ques(Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
tion by physician regarding the nature
HlOWright, 58 U.S.L.W. at 5040.
of sexual activity with an adult); ComIn Wright, a mother and her boy- monwealth v. Comtois, 506 N.E.2d 503
friend were convicted for the sexual (Mass. 1987) (holding statements made
abuse of her two girls, ages five and by children to pediatrician concerning
one-half and two and one-half years. sexual abuse during an examination
Ms. Wright appealed a conviction for were admissible); State v. Reynolds,
the abuse of the younger child. This 378 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)
conviction rested on hearsay testimony (holding that statement describing
from the treating physician. The two events surrounding vaginal penetration
and one-half year-old was not compe- was relevant to providing an examinatent to testify at trial. The Court re- tion of the child); State v. Drake, 761
versed, finding that Wright's right to P.2d 879 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (holdconfrontation had been violated and ing that the lower court properly admitthat the statements did not qualify un- ted statements after an in-camera hearder any exception to the hearsay rule. ing had been held to detennine if the
The Court made this finding based on statements as to cause were pertinent to
its conclusion that the child's state- diagnosis and treatment); State v.
ments to the physician lacked a "par- Bowden, 386 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 1986)
ticularized guarantee of trustworthi- (holding that trial court correctly admitted testimony that a child nodded
ness."
10lMorgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, her head to questions asked during a
physical examination). But see State v.
948 (4th Cir. 1988).
H12Statev. Sorenson,421 N.W.2d77, 85 Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987)
(holding that a statement as to cause
(JIis. 1988).

had not been elicited to further diagnosis or treatment).
I08See Stallnackerv. State, 715 S.W.2d
883 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (holding admissible statement identifying perpetrator as, the identification was pertinent to preventing the recurrence ofthe
abuse and in the treatment of child who
had been abused at home); State v.
Dollinger, 568 A.2d 1058 (Conn. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that the identity of
the abuser is pertinent when the abuser
is a member of the child's household;
this information facilitates treatment
ofphysical and psychological injuries);
State v. Gray, 502 So. 2d 1114, 1117
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding admissible a child's statement that her mother
had beaten her with a hammer because
such information was an "integral part
of the examination"); State v. Larson,
453 N.W.2d42 (Minn. 1990) (holding
that statements identifying father as
abuser were pertinent to treatment);
State v. Aguallo, 350 S.E.2d 76 (N.C.
1986) (holding that identity of perpetrator was relevant to providing a safe
environment for the victim); State v.
Reynolds. 378 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. App.
Ct. 1989); State v. Miller, 589 N.E.2d
693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (admitting
statement by child to physician which
identified father as assailant); State v.
Roberts. 775 P.2d 342 (Or. Ct. App.
1989) (holding statements identifying
mother pertinent to medical and psychological treatment); State v.
Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1988)
(holding that statement in which the
child identified uncle as the abuser was
admissible through physician's testimony because it was pertinent to making a diagnosis of the physical and
emotional condition of a child repeatedlysexuallyabused); Goldadev. State,
674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983) (holding
identity of abuser was pertinent to
medical treatment and consistent with
public policy of protecting children
from abuse); Stephens v. State, 774
P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that the
proper foundation must be laid for statements as to fault or causation to be
admitted). But see Sulka v. State, 717
P.2d394 (AlaskaCt. App.1986)(holding that the identity of the assailant was
not admissible under Fed. R. Evid.

803(4), as such testimony violates the
defendant's right to confrontation);
W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo.
1984) (holding that statements identifying uncle as abuser were not pertinent to diagnosis or treatment because
the child was referred to the physician
solely for the purpose of expert testimony in criminal proceedings); State v.
Conn, 451 N.W.2d555 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990) (holding inadmissible statements
of identification by a seven year-old);
State v. Camele, 360 S.E.2d 307 (S.C.
1987) (holding inadmissible statements
by child to doctor in which the child
said that neither his mother nor his
stepfather had committed the abuse
was not admissible; the court additionally held that statements that the defendant had committed fellatio upon him
were inadmissible; both of these statements did not assist the doctor in determining whether the child had been
sexually abused).
I09See State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801
(Ariz. 1987) (holding admissible statements as to cause and identity of the
abuser; the psychologist testified that
these statements were made during the
course of treatment and were crucial to
effective diagnosis and treatment);
Statev. Larson, 453 N.W. 2d42 {Minn.
1990) (holding that statements to a
psychologist which identify the abuser
are admissible as they are pertinent to
treatment); Statev. Altgilbers, 786 P.2d
680 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
a statement of identity bears on the
child's selfperception and her relationship to the assailant); Macias v. State,
776 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding admissible statements made
for the purpose of medical diagnosis
and treatment which were in a
psychologist's report; the child had
stated that the defendant had sexually
abused her by inserting his fingers into

hervagina);Statev.Nelson,406N.W.2d
385 (Wis. 1987) (holding admissible
statements identifying father as abuser
as pertinent to diagnosis and treatment
by two psychologists); Stephens v.
State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that statements ofidentity given to
psychotherapist must have been relied
upon for treatment or diagnosis). But
see Wardv. State, 368 S.E.2d 139 (Ga.

Ct. App. 1988) (holding that statements
identifying the perpetrator were admissible only as they pertain to the
psychologist's opinion as an expert,
but not admissible if offered solely as a
statement made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment); People v. laLone,
437 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Mich. 1989)
(holding that a child's statement of
identification made to a psychologist
did not fall within Fed. R. Evid. 803(4),
because physician's reliance on such
information to determine the need for
protective measure was not "envisioned
by the drafters"); State v. Gokey, 574
A.2d 766 (Vt. 1990) (holding child's
statements detailing the abuse and identifying the perpetrator inadmissible because these statements were made for
the purpose of expert testimony).
llOState v. Oleson, 443 N.W.2d 8, 10
(S.D. 1989) (Henderson, J., concurring).
III United Statesv. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d
77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450
U.S. 1001 (1981).
112Id. at 84.

113Id.
114Id.
llSRenville, 779 F.2d43 0 (8thCir. 1985).
See also United States v. Provost, 875
F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding admissible statements of cause and identification made to a physician and a
psychologist by a ten year-old girl).
116Id. at 436. See Morgan v. Foretich,
846F.2d941 (4thCir.1988)(accepting
Renville's judgment that abuse in the
home presents a different situation
"which requires great caution in excluding highly pertinent evidence").
117406 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1987).
Nelson's daughter became distraUght
over visitations with him. She described several incidents ofsexual abuse
to her mother, who then carried the
child to a psychologist. Over a period
of sixty sessions, the child implicated
Nelson as a possible abuser.
Nelson's conviction was later affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Nelson
v. Farrey, 874F.2d 122 (7thCir. 1989).
This court found that Nelson's right to
confrontation had not been violated
because statements were sufficiently
reliable based on other hearsay evi-
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dence which had been admitted without objection. The court further noted
that psychologists employ professional
skills to elicit truthful statements which,
although not infallible, could be considered by a jury. Id. at 129.
1I8Tuerkheimer, Convictions Through
Hearsay in Child Abuse Cases: A Logical Progression Back to Square One,
72 Marq. L. Rev. 47, 53 (1988).
The psychologist also testified that
she asked the child whether she would
tell the truth; the child replied "I don't
have to tell the truth." Nelson, 406
N.W.2d at 396.
II9'[uerkheimer, supra note 118, at 54.
12°Sulka v. State, 717 P.2d. 394 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1986).
12174 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666 (1988).
"This" referred to bruises on the child's
body noted by the physician during the
physical examination. The child had
been brought to the hospital by a protective service worker.
I22Id. at 680.

I23Id.
I24Id. at 682 n. 14.
12S77 Md. App. 20,549 A.2d 27 (1988).
126Francis Scott Key Medical Center is
one of three rape centers in the Baltimore area. The pediatric team uses a
multidisciplinary approach similar to a
child advocacy team.
127An examination of the child's vaginal area revealed a blood clot at the
hymen, a vaginal opening much larger
than the nonn for this age, and poor
rectal sphincter tone.
128Using an anatomically-correct doll,
the child identified the penis as a "tutor." She named the girl doll Cindy and
the boy doll Cindy's Dad.
129Id. at 34. The social worker had
infonned Rachel of the team's concern
over the blood in her panties.
13O'fhe court took notice of the fact that
the pediatrician had referred the child
to find the source of the bleeding and to
obtain a plan for treatment.
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